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Abstract
Reciprocal altruism involves foregoing an immediate beneﬁt for the sake of a greater long-term reward.
It follows that individuals who exhibit a stronger preference for future over immediate rewards should be
more disposed to engage in reciprocal altruism – in other words, ‘patient’ people should be more cooper-
ative. The present study tested this prediction by investigating whether participants’ contributions in a pub-
lic-good game correlated with their ‘discount rate’. The hypothesis was supported: patient people are indeed
more cooperative. The paper discusses alternative interpretations of this result, and makes some sugges-
tions for future research.
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1. Introduction
Evolutionary theory has no problem explaining why organisms are impatient. Other things
being equal, the sooner an organism can acquire the resources needed to reproduce the better
(Daly & Wilson, 2005). It is a problem, however, for evolutionary theory to explain why organ-
isms are ever ‘patient’ – that is, why they ever delay consumption of a resource. The solution in-
volves identifying situations in which foregoing an immediate beneﬁt creates a future beneﬁt that
is suﬃciently large to compensate for the delay.
Reciprocal altruism provides one example of just such a situation. Reciprocal altruism involves
foregoing a beneﬁt (or incurring a cost) now – in terms of acting altruistically to beneﬁt another –
in order to receive a larger beneﬁt in return at a later date (Axelrod, 1984; Trivers, 1971). For re-
ciprocal altruism to evolve, the returned beneﬁt must not only be greater than the cost, it must be
suﬃciently great to compensate for the delay (Axelrod, 1984, pp. 12–13, 126–7).
Axelrod used the terms ‘discount parameter’ or ‘discount rate’ to refer to the rate at which the
objective value of a beneﬁt declines as a function of the delay in its delivery; the same ﬁgure –
when employed as an ‘interest rate’ – can be used to calculate the rate at which the value of a ben-
eﬁt must increase over time in order to be ‘worth the wait’. Subsequent empirical research into
temporal decision-making has used ‘discount rate’ to refer to the degree to which individuals sub-
jectively discount the value of future rewards as a function of delay in their delivery. Studies have
shown that, on average, people have a subjective discount rate of approximately 1% per day – but
diﬀerent individuals on diﬀerent tasks exhibit ‘‘spectacular variation’’ in discount rates (Frederick,
Loewenstein, & O’Donoghue, 2003, p. 14).
Given that individuals diﬀer in the degree to which they value the future, we should expect such
diﬀerences to be reﬂected in individual diﬀerences in the degree to which individuals engage in re-
ciprocal altruism – in other words, ‘patient’ people should be more cooperative.
One previous study has indeed found such a relationship (Harris, 2001; Harris & Madden,
2002). Harris found a 0.4 correlation between discount rate and defections in a 40-round, two-
player, prisoner’s dilemma.
The present study looked at whether a similar eﬀect could be found in a diﬀerent game: a one-
shot, variable contribution, four-player public-good game. In such one-shot games the payoﬀ-
maximizing choice is always to defect, or to contribute as little as possible. Nevertheless, people
tend to play such games ‘as if’ they are repeated, and feel that they ‘ought’ to cooperate, and do
so, albeit at a lower level (Ostrom, 1998; Trivers, 2004). Thus the present study provides a more
stringent test of the hypothesis that patient people will be more cooperative.
2. Method
The study involved eight public-good game sessions at the Interdisciplinary Experimental Lab-
oratory at Indiana University, Bloomington. Participants (N = 96; 56 male, 40 female) were
undergraduates from economics and psychology classes who had volunteered their email ad-
dresses for inclusion in a participant recruitment database. In each session, twelve participants
were randomly assigned into four-player groups. Participants received a US$5.00 show-up fee,
and were told that they could earn additional cash by participating in the experiment. An instruc-
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tional script was read aloud in each session. The experiment was ‘double blind’ in that all partic-
ipants’ decisions remained anonymous to both co-participants and to experimenters. No inter-
participant communication was allowed, and participants could not identify their own group
co-members. Final payments were made by means of numbered mailboxes located in a separate
room, thus avoiding any face-to-face interaction between experimenter and participant.
Participants’ cooperativeness was measured by their contributions in a standard public-good
game. In the game, participants received ten tokens (worth $0.50 each), any portion of which they
could allocate to a ‘group account’. These allocations were doubled and redistributed among all
four group members, for a marginal per capita return of 0.5. Each player’s non-allocated tokens
became a part of his or her private earnings. Thus the game met the conditions for a classic free-
rider problem: all else being equal, the highest net beneﬁts will go to members who contribute the
least, and each member has a private incentive to contribute the minimum. (Speciﬁcally, if allo-
cations are multiplied by m and then redistributed equally to all n members, then when
1 < m < n, each member can produce resources for the group by contributing, but can beneﬁt
more personally by free-riding.) Average earnings (including the show-up fee) were $12.01 for
about 40 minutes of participation.
Participants’ evaluations of the future were measured using a version of the discount-rate test
developed by Kirby and Marakovic (Kirby, 2000; Kirby & Marakovic, 1996). This test consisted
of 21 questions of the kind: ‘‘Would you prefer $33 today, or $41 in 19 days?’’ The 21 questions,
representing ascending discount rates, were presented in random order. Individuals’ discount rates
are calculated by ﬁnding the point at which they switch from choosing the sooner to the later re-
ward. (A lower discount rate indicates greater patience.) To motivate genuine responses, in each
session participants were told that one of them would win one of their choices. After the exper-
iment, one answer from one of the answer sheets was selected at random in front of the partici-
pants. The selected participant received a voucher, redeemable for cash, for the amount chosen
after the delay speciﬁed. Participants had to take the voucher to the departmental oﬃce in order
to receive their reward; this was to ensure that ‘transaction costs’ were the same across diﬀerent
periods of delay. Average payment was $36.88 per session. Five participants failed to complete the
discount-rate test, and their data were removed from the ﬁnal results.
3. Results
The results revealed a signiﬁcant correlation, in the expected direction, between contribution
and discount rate.
Overall, the mean contribution to the group account was 4.3 tokens (sd = 3.5). And the mean
discount rate was 0.011 (sd = 0.005); in other words, the average participant devalued future re-
wards at the rate of 1.1% per day. Neither contributions nor discount rates were related to par-
ticipant sex (Mann–Whitney and t-tests, two-tailed p values > 0.28). And neither contributions
nor discount rates were normally distributed; 25% of participants contributed zero tokens,
and participants tended to clump at the centre of the range of discount rates (mode = 0.0096).
The nonparametric (rs = 0.21) and parametric (r = 0.27) correlations between contribution
and discount rate were both signiﬁcant (two-tailed p values < 0.05). (Note that, in contrast to
the Harris study, we are correlating contributions, rather than defections, with discount rates.
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Hence we expect to ﬁnd a negative correlation: the higher the contribution, the lower the dis-
count rate.)
Also, discount rates correlated positively with earnings in the game (mean = $7.01, sd = $1.72;
r = 0.22, two-tailed p < 0.05; rs = 0.16, two-tailed p = 0.14), although the nonparametric correla-
tion falls short of signiﬁcance. This result is not surprising given that the game is designed such
that higher contributions result in lower payoﬀs, and discount rates are negatively correlated with
contributions.
4. Discussion
The results support the prediction that patient people are more cooperative, even in a one-shot
public-good game.
The correlation between cooperativeness and discount rate was somewhat weaker than the 0.4
correlation between discount rate and defections that Harris (Harris, 2001; Harris & Madden,
2002) found in a repeated two-player prisoner’s dilemma game. While there is reason to think that
cooperativeness would have been higher in our game if it too had been repeated, or if anonymity
had been reduced (Bateson, Nettle, & Roberts, 2006; Haley & Fessler, 2005), there is no strong
theoretical reason for thinking that either of these conditions would aﬀect the correlation between
discount rates and contributions.
How should one interpret the correlation between patience and cooperation?
One possibility is that there is a general-purpose, domain-general ability to be patient – also
referred to as the ability to ‘delay gratiﬁcation’, or to exert ‘will power’ or ‘self-control’ – that
stands apart from, and exerts an inﬂuence over, the mechanisms responsible for reciprocal altru-
ism. Indeed, some theorists have suggested that the evolution of ‘patience’ preceded, and was a
necessary pre-requisite for, the evolution of reciprocal altruism (Stevens & Hauser, 2004).
A second possibility is that there is no general-purpose ability to be patient; rather, there are
numerous special-purpose, domain-speciﬁc psychological mechanisms (Tooby & Cosmides,
1992) each of which ‘discounts the future’ at a rate that reﬂects the diﬀerent temporal distribution
of goods in their respective domain. These various mechanisms might exhibit diﬀerent discount
rates for diﬀerent goods – such as food, mates, favours, and punishment. If so, then the public-
good game may measure cooperativeness (which is regulated in part by the discount rate internal
to the mechanisms responsible for reciprocal altruism); and the discount-rate test may assess the
discount rate internal to some other set of mechanisms, perhaps those responsible for foraging;
and the discount rates of both sets of mechanisms may be correlated because they are inﬂuenced
by some common third factor, perhaps age, life-expectancy or metabolic rate. In this sense, a per-
son’s overall discount rate (‘d’) would be like their general intelligence quotient (‘g’) in being a
measure not of some distinct ability or mechanism, but rather an abstract measure that reﬂects
the performance of a range of mechanisms. Incidentally, this domain-speciﬁc interpretation of dis-
count rates has the advantage of being able to explain the ‘‘spectacular variation’’ in rates uncov-
ered by experimental economists (Frederick et al., 2003, p. 14).
A third possibility, consistent with the domain-speciﬁc account, is that while the public-good
game measures cooperativeness, the discount-rate test measures the discount rate internal to
the mechanisms responsible for reciprocal altruism. It is possible, after all, that participants are
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interpreting discount-rate questions like ‘‘Would you prefer $33 today, or $41 in 19 days?’’ as so-
cial exchanges (an immediate cost in return for a future beneﬁt) that vary in terms of the delay of
the returned beneﬁt. Indeed, money itself may be interpreted as a form of social exchange – as
Richard Dawkins has put it, money is a ‘‘formal token of delayed reciprocal altruism’’ (Dawkins,
1976, p. 188) – thus the discount rate exhibited for money may be the same as the discount rate
exhibited for future cooperative interactions. If so, then the reported correlation is a measure of
the relative importance of an internal regulatory variable – the evaluation of the future – to the
decision to cooperate.
Further theoretical and empirical work – perhaps involving systematic variation in the ‘cur-
rency’ in which the discount rates are measured – will be needed to help decide between these
alternatives.
5. Conclusion
The present study demonstrated that patience is a virtue, in the sense that participants who
cooperated by contributing more to the public-good exhibited lower discount rates. The study
also brought to light a series of deeper issues that have to do with the mechanisms responsible
for decisions over time and the nature of patience.
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